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Sarah Buhler* Troubling Feelings: Moral Anger and
Clinical Legal Education
Many law students experience strong and sometimes difficult emotions during
their time in clinical law programs: sadness at clients'stories of trauma, excitement
about a victory in court, or anger at the injustices faced by clients. In this article, I
focus on the emotion of "moral anger, "or "moral outrage" experienced by lawyers
and students in clinical contexts, and consider how educators and students might
address manifestations of moral anger in clinical law contexts in ways that ignite
a critical and social-justice oriented approach to legal practice. By drawing on
theoretical insights from the emerging field of critical emotion studies, I argue
that a critical analysis of the role of moral anger in clinical legal education reveals
its potential as an agent of transformation, but also signals a need for clinical
educators to be wary of an uncritical understanding of this strong emotion.
Drawing on the work of Michalinos Zembylas, Sara Ahmed, and others, I propose
that clinical law students and teachers should seek to engage in critical "readings" •
of moral anger-interpretations that acknowledge the role of strong emotions
in legal practice, and then interrogate the meaning of these feelings in light of
community context, power relations, and history. Such an approach, I argue, can
literally "move" us into deeper understandings and potentially more meaningful
and collaborative social-justice oriented practices.
Beaucoup d'6tudiants en droit 6prouvent des emotions fortes, parfois difficiles 1
vivre, tors des entrevues rdalisdes pendant le programme de cliniques : tristesse
face aux drames v~cus par les clients, enthousiasme J la suite d'une victoire
devant le tribunal, col~re devant I'injustice dont sont victimes les clients. Dans cet
article, I'auteure traite de la col~re et de I'indignation qu'eprouvent les avocats et
les 6tudiants dans ces contextes cliniques; elle se demande comment, dans ces
contextes, 6ducateurs et 6tudiants peuvent r~agir a la col~re et a I'indignation
d'une maniere qui les incite 6 adopter une approche critique et ax6e sur la justice
sociale dans leur pratique du droit. S'inspirant de points de vue qui ressortent du
•domaine 6mergent d'etudes des 6motions critiques, elle avance qu'une analyse
critique du r61e de la colere et de I'indignation dans 1'6ducation juridique revile
son potentiel d'6tre un facteur de transformation. Cependant, elle signale aussi la
n6cessitd pour les 6ducateurs cliniques de se mefier d'une acceptation de cette
6motion forte sans aucun regard critique. Se fondant sur les travaux de Michalinos
Zembylas, de Sara Ahmed et d'autres auteurs, rauteure propose que les etudiants
et les professeurs de droit clinique cherchent j faire une lecture critique de la
colere et de l'indignation, J en faire une interpr6tation qui prend en compte le
role des 6motions fortes dans la pratique du droit puis qu'ils sinterrogent sur la
signification de ces sentiments dans le contexte communautaire et dans celui
des relations de pouvoir et de I'histoire. L'auteure prtend qu'une telle approche
peut littnralement nous amener 6 une comprehension approfondie et nous inciter
j adopter des pratiques plus significatives axles sur la collaboration et sur la
justice sociale.
* Assistant Professor, University of Saskatchewan College of Law.
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Introduction
Many law students experience strong and sometimes difficult emotions
during their time in clinical law programs: sadness at clients' stories of
trauma, excitement about a victory in court, or anger at the injustices faced
by clients. Clinical experiences, writes Sara Chandler, "expose students to
emotional settings not normally experienced in law school; the challenge of
handling their own and other people's emotions in difficult and sometimes
harrowing situations."' While various writers have identified clinical legal
education's role in addressing issues relating to the emotional dimensions
of legal practice,2 and while there is a burgeoning interest in "law and
1. Sara Chandler, "Can Litigators Let Go? The Role of Practitioner-Supervisors in Clinical Legal
Education Programmes" in Paul Maharg & Caroline Maughan, eds,-Affect and Legal Education:
Emotion in Learning and Teaching the Law (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011) 87 at 88.
2. See, e.g.: Philip Plowden, who wrote that clinical work "puts the emotional content back into
law": Philip Plowden, "Clinical Legal Education: Theory, Practice and Possibilities," UK Centre for
Legal Education (4 June 2010), online: UK Centre for Legal Education <http://www.ukcle.ac.uk/
resources/teaching-and-learning-practices/plowden>. See also Marjorie A Silver, Sanford Portnoy &
Jean Koh Peters, "Stress, Burnout, Vicarious Trauma, and other Emotional Realities in the Lawyer/
Client Relationship" (2004) 19 Touro L Rev 847; Laurel E Fletcher & Harvey M Weinstein, "When
Students Lose Perspective: Clinical Supervision and the Management of Empathy" (2002) 9 Clinical L
Rev 135; and Ann Juergens, "Practicing what We Teach: The Importance of Emotion and Community
Connection in Law Work and Law Teaching" (2005) 11 Clinical L Rev 413.
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emotions" scholarship,3 the role of emotions in legal education generally,
and in clinical legal education in particular, remains under-theorized. In
this article, I focus on the emotion of "moral anger" or "moral outrage"
experienced by lawyers and students in clinical contexts. I consider how
educators and students might address manifestations of moral anger
in clinical law contexts in ways that ignite a critical and social-justice
oriented approach to legal practice.5
Moral anger has been described by Roger Giner-Sorolla as a type
of anger that emerges from "judgments that other people are violating
justice norms: harming others, violating their rights, or being unfair."6 It is
conceived as a reaction to a perceived injustice, drawing on "rules of blame
and fairness, taking into account the legitimacy of claims, intentionality of
action.. .and generally working with the concept of rights."7 The concept
of moral anger has perhaps most famously been evoked by Aristotle's
aphorism that anyone "who does not get angry when there is reason to
be angry, or does not get angry in the right way at the right time and
with the right people, is a dolt."8 Moral anger is a profoundly political
emotion, because, as Michalinos Zembylas points out, it "involves
making judgments about what constitutes injustice, what expressions are
3. See, e.g.: Terry A Maroney, "Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field"
(2006) 30 Law and Hum Behav 119; Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keran, "Who's Afraid of Law and the
Emotions?" (2010) 94 Minn L Rev 1997; Susan A Bandes, ed, The Passions of Law (New York: New
York University Press, 1999); Martha C Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and
the Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Richard Delgado, "Recent Writing on Law
and Happiness" (2012) 97 Iowa L Rev 912; Kathryn Abrams, "Barriers and Boundaries: Exploring
Emotion in the Law of the Family" (2009) 16 Va J Soc Pol'y & L 301; Katharine K Baker, "Gender
and Emotion in Criminal Law" (2005) 28 Harv J L & Gender 447; and Hilliard Aronovitch, "The Role
of Emotions in the Rule of Law" (2007) 57 UTLJ 781.
4. A recent exception is the book Affect and Legal Education: Emotion in Learning and Teaching
the Law, supra note 1. See also Grant H Morris, "Teaching with Emotion: Enriching the Educational
Experience of First-Year Law Students" (2010) 47 San Diego L Rev 465.
5. Clinical legal education has long been associated with social justice and critical approaches
to legal practice. See, e.g., Shin Imai, "A C6unter-Pedagogy for Social Justice: Core Skills for
Community-Based Lawyering" (2002) 9 Clinical L Rev 195; Rose Voyvodic & Mary Medcalf,
"Advancing Social Justice Through an Interdisciplinary Approach to Clinical Legal Education:
The Case of Legal Assistance of Windsor" (2004) 14 Wash UJL & Pol'y 101; Phyllis Goldfarb, "A
Theory-Practice Spiral: the Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Legal Education" (1990) 75 Minn L Rev
1599 at 1646; and Jon C Dubin "Clinical Design for Social Justice Imperatives" (1998) 51 SMU L Rev
1461 at 1465.
6. Roger Giner-Sorolla, Judging Passions: Moral Emotions in Persons and Groups (London:
Psychology Press, 2012) at 88.
7. Ibd at 93.
8. Quoted in Elizabeth V Spelman, "Anger and Insubordination" in Ann Garry & Marilyn Pearsall,
eds, Women, Knowledge, and Reality: Explorations in Feminist Philosophy (Boston: Unwin Hyman,
1989) 263 at 263.
400 The Dalhousie Law Journal
appropriate, and under what circumstances."9 In the context of clinical
and poverty law, the role of moral anger is described as follows by Abbe
Smith:
You cannot represent the poor without finding occasion for outrage.
The outrages just keep coming. They prevail. They reign. And if you
pay attention to the outrageous things that are routinely inflicted on the
poor.. .you will be driven to act. You will be inspired.'"
Moral anger is a particularly important emotion to consider in the
context of legal education because it is so closely connected to notions
of justice and injustice, which are central concerns of law. A number of
authors have detailed the complicated interconnections between emotions,
including moral anger, and legal decision-making." This scholarship
posits that feelings, including outrage about injustice, can and do shape the
actions of lawyers and judges. As Robert Solomon argues, "[t]he idea that
justice requires emotional detachment, a kind of purity suited ultimately
to angels [and] ideal observers.. .has blinded us to the fact that justice
arises from and requires... feelings."'" However, the fact remains that
lawyers and judges rarely acknowledge the role of moral outrage in legal
decision-making or legal practice. As I will discuss below, dominant legal
discourse constructs emotions as falling utterly outside the boundaries of
law and therefore holding scant, if any, relevance to the work of lawyers.
These dominant assumptions about the irrelevance of emotions in legal
processes are associated with a tendency among some lawyers to suppress
expressions of emotions in legal contexts and to cultivate a technocratic
affect and approach to practice. "3
The suppression and management of emotions in general, and moral
anger in particular, is particularly significantly in clinical law contexts. If,
9. Michalinos Zembylas, The Politics of Trauma in Education (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2008) at 127.
10. Abbe Smith, "Too Much Heart and Not Enough Heat: the Short Life and Fractured Ego of the
Empathic, Heroic Public Defender" (2004) 37:5 UC Davis L Rev 1203 at 1259-1260.
11. See Laura E Little, "Adjudication and Emotion" (2002) 3 Fla Coastal U 205; Todd E Pettys, "The
Emotional Juror" (2007) 76 Fordham L Rev 1609; Sharyn Roach Anleau & Kathy Mack, "Magistrates'
Everyday Work and Emotional Labor" (2005) 32 JL & Soc'y 590; Terry A Maroney, "Emotional
Regulation and Judicial BehaviQr"(2011) 99 Cal L Rev 1485; Susan A Bandes, "Moral Imagination in
Judging" (2011) 51 Washburn LJ 1; Samuel H Pillsbury, "Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions
of Criminal Punishment" (1989) 74 Comell L Rev 655; Lynne Henderson, "Legality and Empathy"
(1987) 85 Mich L Rev 1574.
12. Robert C Solomon, A Passion for Justice: Emotions and the Origins of the Social Contract
(Oxford: Rowman & Littefield, 1995) at 34.
13. See Philip C Kissam, The Discipline of Law Schools: the Making of Modern Lawyers (Durham:
Carolina Academic Press, 2003) at 96-98 and, generally, Margaret Thornton, "Technocentrism in the
Law School: Why the Gender and Colour of Law Remain the Same" (1998) 36 Osgoode Hall U 369.
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as Sara Ahmed writes (referencing Audre Lorde), the emotion of anger
"involves imagining a different kind of world in its very 'energy,"' 14 then
it has the potential to be a powerful tool in transformative and politically-
charged learning about justice. By drawing on theoretical insights from
the emerging field of critical emotion studies, I argue that it is important to
acknowledge and carefully examine the troubling emotion of moral anger
in clinical legal education contexts. I argue that a critical analysis of the
role of moral anger in clinical legal education reveals its potential as an
agent of transformation, but also signals a need for clinical educators to be
wary of an uncritical understanding of this strong emotion. As Michalinos
Zembylas points out, it is important to remain aware that "anger is not
inevitably emancipatory but ambivalent, because it is part of an ongoing
struggle of power relations.' 5 Drawing on the work of Michalinos
Zembylas, Sara Ahmed, and others, I propose that clinical law students
and teachers should seek to engage in critical "readings" of moral anger
-interpretations that acknowledge the role of strong emotions in legal
practice, and then interrogate the meaning of these feelings in light of
community context, power relations, and history. Such an approach, I
argue, can literally "move" us into deeper understandings and potentially
more meaningful and collaborative social-justice oriented practices. 16
I. Critical emotion studies
Emotions are often theorized as private, biologically determined
experiences of individuals and of little concern to the "public" sphere
of social relations, politics, and culture. Certainly, Western thought has
long constructed a sharp dichotomy separating "reason" from "emotion."
Alison Jaggar writes that "[n]ot only has reason been contrasted with
emotion, but it has also been associated with the mental, the cultural, the
universal, the public, and the male, whereas emotion has been associated
with the irrational, the physical, the natural, the particular, the private, and,
of course, the female."' 17 Similarly, Paul Mahrag and Caroline Maughan
note that emotion has long been positioned as being "antithetical to core
Western ideals of rationality."' 8
14. Sara Ahmed, The Cultural Politics ofEmotion (New York: Routledge, 2004) at 175.
15. Zembylas, supra note 9 at 120.
16. Ahmed writes about the "moving" nature of emotions: see supra note 14 at- 171.
17. Alison M Jaggar, "Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology" in Ann Garry &
Marilyn Pearsall, eds, Women, Knowledge, and Reality: Explorations in Feminist Philosophy (Boston:
Unwin Hyman, 1989) 129 at 129.
18. Paul Maharg & Caroline Maughan, "Introduction" in Paul Maharg & Caroline Maughan, eds,
Affect and Legal Education: Emotion in Learning and Teaching the Law (Burlington, VT: Ashgate,
2011) at 1.
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However, the idea of emotions as "natural" and biologically-driven
responses and the corresponding construct of a reason-emotion binary
has been challenged with the emergence of the interdisciplinary field of
critical emotion studies, which focuses on critical social constructionist
accounts of emotions. Critical emotion studies theorists assert the social
nature of emotions and explore how emotions are culturally produced and
mediated. That is, critical emotions theory opens up the notion that our
emotional responses are not simply innate but rather are mediated through
dominant norms and cultural expectations& In other words, "individual
experience [of emotions] is simultaneously social experience." 9 For
example, Arlie Hochschild introduces the notion of "feeling rules" that
define dominant social expectations about "what we should feel in various
circumstances."2 Emotions are thus constructed as "stances toward
the world, emblematic of the individual's apprehension of it and moral
position within it."'" Critical emotions theorists also argue that, while being
culturally constructed, emotions are structuring forces in their own right.
In other words, emotions produce moral and cultural stances towards the
world, even as they are simultaneously socially produced.22 Sara Ahmed
describes it this way:
Focusing on emotions as mediated rather than immediate reminds us
that knowledge cannot be separated from the bodily world of feeling and
sensation; knowledge is bound up with what makes us sweat, shudder,
tremble, all those feelings that are crucially felt on the bodily surface, the
skin surface where we touch and are touched by the world.23
As both Simon Williams and Stepfan Mestrovic point out, in the
current hyper-capitalist era of spectacle and consumption, emotions are
perpetually manipulated, marketed, and manufactured through dominant
media and news images.24 Indeed, social theorist Mestrovic asserts that
we now live in a "postemotional age" where our feelings are primarily
19. Jaggar, supra note 17 at 136. See also Simon Williams, Emotion and Social Theory (London:
Sage Publications, 2001) at 45 and Lisa Langstraat & Melody Bowdon, "Service-Learning and
Critical Emotion Studies: On the Perils of Empathy and the Politics of Compassion" (2011) Mich J of
Community Service Learning 5 at 6.
20. Arlie Russell Hochschild, "The Sociology of Feeling and Emotion: Selected Possibilities" in
Marcia Millan & Rosabeth Moss Kanter, eds, Another Voice: Feminist Perspectives on Social Life and
Social Science (New York: Anchor Books, 1975) 280 at 289.
21. Joanne Finklestein, "Considerations for a Sociology of the Emotions" (1980) 3 Studies in
Symbolic Interaction Ill at 119.
22. Ibid. See also Williams, supra note 19 at 49.
23. Ahmed, supra note 14 at 171.
24. See Williams, supra note 19 at 112, and Stjepan G Mestrovic, Postemotional Society (London:
SAGE Publications,. 1997) at 1-7.
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manufactured and mechanized by mass media and dominant culture..25
In this way, emotions function to perpetuate the relentless cycle of
consumerism and the concomitant neoliberal economic order: according
to critical emotions theorists, emotions are thus intimately tied to political
ideologies. As Nikolas Rose concludes:
Social conventions, community scrutiny, legal norms, familial
obligations and religious injunctions have exercised an intense power
over the human soul.. .Thoughts, feelings, and actions may appear as
the very fabric and constitution of the intimate self, but they are socially
organized and managed in minute particulars.26
Thus, ideas about "acceptable" emotions function as a form of what
Foucault calls "technologies of the self," which work to regulate behaviour
and induce conformity to dominant ideologies. 27
In addition to pointing out the political, cultural and ideological
fuictions and sources of emotions, critical emotions theorists also
fundamentally challenge the notion of a neat reason-emotion binary.
Critical emotion theorists assert that emotions are fundamentally
intertwined in all actions and decision-making processes. Given the
social construction of emotions, individuals may be "reasoned 'in' and
'out' of their emotions depending on whether or not they'are deemed
reasonable and appropriate or unreasonable and inappropriate. '28 Critical
emotions scholars, such as Boler,29 many drawing on feminist theoretical
frameworks, point out that claims to rationality are more often than not
assertions of power and ideology that function to discount and silence
alternate and subversive accounts of social reality.
With respect to feelings of outrage at injustice, critical emotions
scholars theorize that the emotion of anger is not simply a feeling that
emerges unmediated or unbounded by cultural narratives aboutjustice and
injustice. Rather, as Rom Harre writes, "to be angry is to have taken on an
angry role on a particular occasion as the expression of a moral position....
The bodily feeling is often the somatic expression to oneself of the taking
of a moral standpoint."30 Whether one feels moral anger and what one
25. Mestrovic, ibid at 1.
26. Nikolas Rose, Governing the Soul: The Shaping of the Private Self(London: Routledge, 1990)
at 17.
27. See discussion about Foucault's notion of "technologies of the self" in Anthony Elliot, Concepts
of the Se/f(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001) at 82.
28. Williams, supra note 19 at 47.
29. Megan Boler, Feeling Power: Emotions and Education (New York: Routledge, 1999) at 1.
30. Rom Harre, Physical Being: A Theory for a Corporeal Psychology (Oxford: Basil Blackwell
1991) at 142-143.
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chooses to do about this feeling is thereby a function of cultural, moral, and
political scripts that literally "move" the body and actions in the world in
particular ways.3 Critical emotions theorists thus point out that dominant
discourses and practices. regarding appropriate expressions of anger can
be politically significant in that they focus on producing "feeling rules
that are socially and culturally determined" and do not threaten dominant
ideologies and systems.32
II. Disciplined emotions in legal education and legal practice
1. Dominant approaches: the rational and technocratic lawyer
The notion of a split between reason and emotion is replicated within
dominant Western legal epistemology and pedagogies. However,
emotions are interpreted, regulated, and disciplined in particular ways in
the context of law schools and legal practice. The privileging of rational
and technical modes of reasoning in dominant law school pedagogies
devalues and actively discourages modes of discourse based on emotion
and experience. Emotions are often viewed within dominant approaches
to legal reasoning as dangerous and corruptive. As Terry Maroney writes,
"[a] core presumption underlying modem legality is that reason and
emotion are different beasts entirely: they belong to separate spheres of
human existence; the sphere of law admits only of reason; and vigilant
policing is required to keep emotion from creeping in where it does not
belong."33 Similarly, Martha Minow and Elizabeth Spelman note: "In law,
for at least a century, the devotion to such a model of reason treats any
attention to intuition, to experience... [to] passions, as corruption. Emotion
and passion signify evil, danger, and threat of disorder."34
The assumption that emotions play no legitimate role in legal
thought tends to be reproduced in legal education. Indeed, the much-
vaunted process of "thinking like a lawyer" is often portrayed in law
schools as including little room for emotion, experience, or non-Western
epistemologies. Law school pedagogies tend to insist upon the separation
of "thinking" and "feeling," and law students quickly learn that outbursts
of passion and emotion, including expressions of outrage at injustice, are
generally not well-received in law school classrooms. As the writers of the
31. Ahmed, supra note 14 at 171.
32. Zembylas, supra note 9 at 119.
33. Maroney, supra note 3 at 120.
34. Martha L Minow & Elizabeth V Spelman, "Passion for Justice" (1988) 10 Cardozo L Rev 37
at 41. Certainly, women were traditionally associated with the irrational and the emotional, and this
played a role in the historic exclusion of women from the legal profession. For a further discussion of
the prevalence of the "technocratic affect" and the implications of these for diversity in the profession,
See Thornton, supra note 13.
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Carnegie Report on legal education observed, law students in American
and Canadian law schools are "told to set aside their desire for justice.
They are warned not to let their moral concerns or compassion for the
people in the cases they discuss to cloud their legal analyses."35 Similarly,
in her study of linguistic and rhetorical strategies within law schools,
Elizabeth Mertz notes that appeals to emotion by law students tended to be
quickly suppressed by professors and fellow students within the first-year
classes she observed.36 The law students in Mertz's study quickly learned
that appeals to senses of moral outrage or feelings about injustice were
seen to be incompatible with a proper "legal" approach to problems.37
Despite the explicit and implicit renunciation of the role of emotion
in dominant legal pedagogies and discourses, emotions do not easily
"disappear" within law schools. Indeed, emotions such as anxiety and
hopelessness are prevalent within law schools.38 Similarly, Rhonda Magee
describes what she calls a "crisis of despair" in legal education.3 9 These
observations about the sadness and anxiety experienced by many law
students are mirrored by studies about unhappiness and hopelessness in
the legal profession as a whole.4 °
It is significant to note, however, that these emotions do not generally
emerge in the public spaces and discourses of law schools. Rather,
many law students and professors cultivate in their public personae and
interactions an emotional style that Philip Kissam calls "coolness."'"
Kissam describes emotional coolness as a detached communicative style,
where outbursts or visible displays of emotion are actively discouraged,
35. William M Sullivan, Anne Colby et al, Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of
Law (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2007) at 187.
36. Elizabeth Mertz, The Language of Law School: Learning to "Think Like a Lawyer" (Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 128.
37. See also Duncan Kennedy, "Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy" (1982) 32 J
Legal Educ 591 at 594.
38. See Julian Webb, "The Body in (E)motion" in Paul Maharg & Caroline Maughan, Affect and
Legal Education: Emotion in Learning and Teaching the Law (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011) 211 at
213.
39. Rhonda V Magee, "Legal Education and the Formation of Professional Identity: A Critical
Spirituo-Humanistic-'Humanity Consciousness'-Perspective" (2007) 31 NYU Rev L & Soc
Change 467 at 467.
40. See, e.g.: Amiran Elwork & G Andrew H Benjamin "Lawyers in Distress" in David B Wexler
& Bruce J Winick, eds, Law in a Therapeutic Key: Developments in Therapeutic Jurisprudence
(Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1996) 569 at 569; Lawrence S Krieger, "The Inseparability
of Professionalism and Personal Satisfaction: Perspectives on Values, Integrity and Happiness" (2005)
11 Clinical L Rev 425; Connie JA Beck, Bruce D Sales & G Andrew H Benjamin "Lawyer Distress:
Alcohol-Related Problems and other Psychological Concerns Among a Sample of Practicing Lawyers
(1995) 10 JL & Health 1.
41. Kissam, supra note 13 at 96-98.
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and where feelings such as despair, hope, anger or joy are controlled.42
According to Kissam, emotional coolness is characterized, by detached yet
friendly communications, banter about topics related to the subjects of law
school, and an avoidance of deeper political or theoretical discussions.43
The style of emotional coolness described by Kissam primes law
students for dominant technocratic and corporatist modes of professional
identity and practice. It reflects the "disciplinary force of the market,"
which represses emotional attachments in favour of rational discourse and
ideals of "manners"'  and "managed hearts. '45 Emotionally disciplined
legal professionals do not become upset or enraged at systemic injustice
or individual suffering but focus instead on operating within a carefully
delimited terrain of legal practice. They are able to function within the
relentlessly competitive atmosphere promulgated by corporate law firm
culture and the adversarial culture of legal practice.46 The detailed work of
critical scholars of professional legal identity illustrates the ways in which
the bodies and emotions of lawyers are disciplined and regulated into a
form of "bleached out professionalism," where lawyers are imagined as
neutral, apolitical and even disembodied technocrats. 47
As critical lawyering theorists have observed, these approaches to
legal practice are far from politically neutral and in fact tend to undermine
progressive social movements and replicate existing societal power
relations a.4 As Kissam concludes, the management of emotions within law
schools assists in producing a conservative attitude of both "skepticism
and apathy" towards "political ideals or ethics. 49 In other words, the
dominant "cool" emotional style promoted in law schools has distinctly
political implications and promotes modes of practice that tend to uphold
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid at 96-97.
44. See Cas Wouters, "The Civilizing of Emotions: Formalization and Informalization" in Debra
Hopkins, Joshen Kleres et al, eds, Theorizing Emotions: Sociological Explorations and Applications
(Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2009) 169 at 178.
45. Arlie Russell Hochschild, The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1983).
46. Kissam, supra note 13 at 68 and 98.
47. See Hilary Sommerlad, "'Becoming' a Lawyer: Gender and the Process of Professional Identity
Formation" in Elizabeth Sheehy & Sheila McIntyre, eds, Calling for Change: Women, Law, and the
Legal Profession (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2006) 159; Sanford Levinson, "Identifying
the Jewish Lawyer: Reflections on the Construction of Professional Identity" (1993) 14 Cardozo
L Rev 1577; David B Wilkins, "Beyond 'Bleached out' Professionalism: Defining Professional
Responsibility for Real Professionals" in Deborah L Rhode, ed, Ethics in Practice: Lawyers'Roles,
Responsibilities, and Regulation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 207 at 209.
48. See, e.g., Janet Mosher, "Legal Education: Nemesis or Ally of Social Movements?" (1997) 35
Osgoode Hall LJ 613 at 629.
49. Kissam, supra note 13 at 229.
Troubling Feelings: Moral Anger and 407
Clinical Legal Education
the status quo. As critical lawyering theorists, including Gerald Lopez,
Anthony Alfieri, and Janet Mosher have described, lawyers imagining
themselves as expert, technocratic knowers within the delimited realm of
law will tend to avoid engagement with larger politicized questions of
social justice and community engagement.5 ° Lopez refers to this dominant
mode of legal practice as "regnant lawyering," which is characterized by
lawyers' tendencies to focus on litigation rather than community-building,
their failure to grasp how law impacts the lives of subordinated people,
and their fantasies of themselves as "preeminent problem-solvers in most
situations they find themselves trying to alter."'"
Certainly, lawyers do occasionally engage in dramatic emotional
displays within courtroom settings 52 Such displays of emotion, however,
are usually performed as a form of theatre.53 Other overt displays of
emotion by lawyers within professional contexts are rare. Indeed, lawyers
tend to be reluctant to acknowledge the role of their own emotions in
their professional advocacy and counseling roles.54 While lawyers may
be willing to acknowledge the emotions of their clients, clients' emotions
are generally treated as separate from the legal problem at hand. That is,
lawyers tend to engage in a process of what Mertz calls the "bracketing"
of emotions-the conceptualizing of emotions as separate and unrelated to
the realm of law, and often unhelpful and burdensome. 5
2. An emerging model: the "emotionally intelligent" lawyer
Of course, it is important to note that legal practice is not homogenous but
rather highly diverse. Norms of legal practice vary according to location,
context, and setting.56 Certainly, dominant technocratic approaches to legal
knowledge and legal practice have been challenged with the emergence
50. Gerald Lopez, Rebellious La-vyering: One Chicano's Vision of Progressive Law Practice
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1992); Anthony Alfieri, "Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice:
Learning Lessons of Client Narrative" (1991) 100 Yale LJ 2107 at 2111; Janet Mosher, supra note 48
at 629.
51. Lopez, ibid at 24.
52. As Martha Nussbaum notes, law without appeal to emotions is "virtually unthinkable,"
Nussbaum, supra note 3 at 5.
53. See, e.g., AG Boss, "(Un)related Purposes: Theatre and Law" (2010) 142 Canadian Theatre
Review 30 at 31.
54. Alan M Lemer, "From Socrates to Damasio, from Langdell to Kandel: the Role of Emotion in
Modem Legal Education" in Paul Maharg & Caroline Maughan, eds, Affect and Legal Education:
Emotion in Learning and Teaching th& Law (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011) 151 at 162.
55. Mertz, supra note 36 at 121.
56. See Mary Helen McNeal, "Slow Down, People Breathing: Lawyering, Culture and Place"
(2011) 18 Clinical L Rev 183 and Robert L Nelson & David M Trubek, "Arenas of Professionalism:
The Professional Ideologies of Lawyers in Context" in Robert L Nelson, David M Trubek & Rayman
L Solomon, eds, Lawyers' Idealsi Lawyers' Practices: Transformations in the American Legal
Profession (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992) 177.
408 The Dalhousie Law Journal
of alternate paradigms. As Julie MacFarlane writes, in recent years,
the culture of legal practice has shifted in significant ways. Increasing
numbers of lawyers are eschewing rights-based adversarial approaches
to lawyering and instead embracing collaborative lawyering
approaches, mediation, and other dispute resolution techniques.57
MacFarlane argues that these shifts represent a movement towards
what she terms "the new lawyer." The new lawyer, she writes, is
distinguished by his or her emphasis on negotiation skills, client-
centred approach, and commitment to interpersonal communication
skills.58 Significantly, she writes, the "new lawyer" must be adept
in the area of "emotional intelligence" as well as legal intelligence.
Emotional intelligence, according to MacFarlane, includes attributes
such as "empathy, self-awareness, optimism, and impulse control."59
MacFarlane embraces the emotional dimensions of lawyering,
advocating that lawyers must have insight into their own and their
clients' emotions in order to effectively work with them to resolve their
legal matters.60 She writes:
[R]ejecting the traditional assumption that emotions and feelings can
somehow be excluded from the lawyer-client relationship, the new
lawyer should accept that it is inevitable that her personal feelings
and biases will become woven into her lawyering practice."'
Other advocates of alternative paradigms of legal practice similarly
emphasize the need for lawyers to become more adept at working with
and understanding their own and their clients' emotions. Various writers,
promoting "affective," collaborative, and client-centred approaches to
legal practice, focus on the centrality of emotions in law and lawyering,
echoing the themes emerging from MacFarlane's work. The literature
in this area tends to rely on discourses of emotional intelligence, which
promote a view of emotions as private attributes of individuals. As
Zembylas points out, discourses of emotional intelligence are often
characterized by a view that emotional intelligence is "a set of skills
hypothesized to contribute to the accurate appraisal and expression of
emotion in self and others, and the use of feelings to motivate, plan,
and achieve in one's life. 62
57. Julie Macfarlane, The New Lawyer: How Settlement is Transforming the Practice of Lar
(Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2008) at 23-24.
58. ]bid at 23.
59. Ibid at 23-24.
60. Ibid at 152.
61. Ibid at 155-156.
62. Zembylas, supra note 9 at 163.
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Significantly, the literature advocating for affective. lawyering,
collaborative lawyering, and client-centred lawyering tends not to shift its
focus from the lawyer-client relationship itself and the emotional dynamics
within this relationship. Marjorie Silver writes about the feelings of "love"
and "hate" within the lawyer-client relationship, 63 and Jane Spinak focuses
upon the emotional reactions of a lawyer to traumatic stories of her client.
This body of scholarship -tends to accept that emotions are natural and
private. The image of the emotionally intelligent lawyer that emerges from
this body of literature is one of a legal professional who is compassionate
and empathetic towards individual clients and who maintains a serene
and even-keeled approach to legal problems. The emotionally intelligent
lawyer is self-reflective and aware of her or his own emotional reactions
towards her clients, but does not tend to analyze or engage with the larger
contexts that shape the legal troubles of her clients. Furthermore, she or
he works to acknowledge her or his own emotions, but also works to keep
these feelings in check, even while being open to the emotions of her
client. 64 Emotionally intelligent lawyers are able to use their emotional
skills to better assist clients in achieving their goals and to better reduce
interpersonal conflicts between clients.
How is the emotion of anger approached in this body of literature?
One example is found in the work of Peter Ladd. In his study on the role
of emotions within the dispute resolution processes of mediation and
conciliation, Ladd dedicates a chapter specifically to the role of anger
in dispute resolution processes. Throughout the chapter, Ladd describes
anger as a retreat from rationality.65 Anger, Ladd writes, emerges from
"unreasonable thinking" which itself can be related to unreasonable
"lifestyle decisions" of the angry person.66 He encourages practitioners to
approach the anger of clients by focusing on "restoring rationality," and sets
out various techniques to employ to this end.67 Ladd's approach locates the
source of anger in irrationality and individual lifestyle decisions. Thus, it
is an individual problem that can be addressed through a return to rational
thinking, rather than an analysis of systemic violence or political forces
that have created injustice in a client's life. Furthermore, by focusing on
63. Marjorie A Silver, "Love, Hate, and other Emotional Interference in the Lawyer/Client
Relationship" (1999) 6 Clinical L Rev 259 at 259; Jane M Spinak, "Reflections on a Case (of
Motherhood)" (1995) 95 Colum L Rev 1990 at 1992.
64. Macfarlane, supra note 57,at 156.
65. Peter D Ladd, Mediation, Conciliation and Emotions: A Practitioner 's Guide for Understanding
Emotions in Dispute Resolution (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 2005) at 64-65.
66. Ibid at 69.
67. Ibid at 79.
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the anger and irrationality of some clients, Ladd constructs an image of
the dispute resolution practitioner that is in touch with emotions and yet
resolutely rational.
Overall, it seems that approaches to legal practice that emphasize the
affective and interpersonal dimensions of lawyering tend to view emotions
as pertaining to individual relationships. These approaches tend to view
emotions as being of interest in terms of a private, therapeutic notion of
the lawyer-client relationship. Emotions are not subject to critical analysis
or analyzed in terms of their meanings in the context of larger questions of
justice and injustice. Rather, lawyers are urged to gain skills in "emotional
intelligence." Lawyers are encouraged to learn how to acknowledge,
diffuse, and manage their own and their clients' emotions.
III. Emotions, moral outrage, and clinical legal education: the existing
literature
Despite the often emotionally charged nature of clinical law experiences,
only a small body of clinical law literature concerns itself directly with the
role of emotions in clinical legal education (and no Canadian clinical law
scholarship focuses specifically upon the role of emotions). For example,
Laurel Fletcher and Harvey Weinstein write that clinical law supervisors
must acknowledge the highly emotional nature of clinical law work
for many students.68 Students' emotional reactions, argue Fletcher and
Weinstein, directly impact the delivery of legal services in clinical law
programs. Emotional intelligence is a key aspect of legal work in clinical
contexts, they write, and therefore clinical law supervisors must focus on
showing students how to attend to the affective dimensions of the lawyer
client relationship. Fletcher and Weinstein's article is helpful in many
respects in teaching students how to work in respectful and holistic ways.
This is crucially important in clinical law contexts. However, Fletcher
and Weinstein do not explicitly connect the emotional responses to legal
practice to larger systemic injustices, nor do they critique dominant
assumptions about emotions as personal, private reactions of individuals
to situations and conflicts.
Ann Juergens also has written about the role of emotions in clinical legal
education settings. She notes that clinical law supervisors should model a
healthy and open approach to emotions.69 Juergens also focuses on the
importance and the emotional implications of "community connections"
in clinical law work. She urges clinical law supervisers to maintain and
68. Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 2.
69. Supra note 2 at 418.
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nurture connections with community organizations and activists as a crucial
part of their work. Juergens writes that keeping community connections
strong can remind lawyers to attempt to find resolutions for clients that
"take the larger fabric into account" when addressing legal problems.7" She
writes that community engagement can alsoassist lawyers and students
in converting rage at injustice into constructive actions, but she does not
describe how this process might unfold.7' Juergens describes her ultimate
goal as being the promotion of the "emotional health" of lawyers and law
students involved in clinical programs.7 2 Thus, although Juergens touches
upon the ways in which moral outrage might play a role in clinical legal
education, and focuses on the importance of a broader view of emotions,
her article does not provide particular critical direction regarding how
moral outrage might be harnessed towards social justice.
Clinical law professor Abbe Smith has written specifically about the
role of moral outrage in poverty law practice. Smith describes in detail the
role of moral outrage in criminal law defense work for indigent clients.
She draws on the idea that outrage can be an indicator of injustice and a
motivator for action for poverty lawyers. Smith notes that moral outrage
is a motivating emotion that "supplies combustion" for poverty lawyers.73
She defines this motivating feeling as "a sense of moral outrage, the sort of
outrage that accompanies conviction. .. outrage as principled resistance."74
She argues that given the structural and systemic injustices faced by
indigent clients, it is impossible to work as a legal advocate in this context
without finding occasion for outrage at injustice.75 The morally outraged
lawyers depicted by Smith utilize their outrage as inspiration and fuel
for their legal advocacy. Drawing on the injustice after injustice faced by
their clients, these lawyers are motivated to keep fighting on behalf of
their clients. Interestingly, Smith writes that many of her clients fail to
demonstrate outrage about their own situations, but rather often appear to
accept injustice as inevitable.76 Thus, in Smith's depiction, it is the lawyers
who are the primary bearers of moral outrage, they are the agents who
engage and confront unjust systems on behalf of their clients.
Thus, the small body of scholarship about the role of emotions in
clinical legal education contexts grapples with the highly emotional nature
70. Ibid at 422.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
73. Smith, supra note 10 at 1259.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibidat 1261.
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of clinical law practice and the feelings evoked in lawyers and law students
as they work on behalf of clients. However, there remains room for a
critical consideration of the role of emotions generally, and of the emotion
of moral anger in particular, in clinical law contexts and pedagogies.
IV. Critical "readings" of moral anger in clinical legal education
Students at the clinic associated with my law school have worked with
clients who have been criminalized based on HIV status, who have been
assaulted by police, and who have lived in rental units where landlords
have failed to provide heat during cold winter months. Students have
experienced highly charged situations in trial and administrative hearing
contexts. They have witnessed times when actors within the legal system
fail to "hear" the stories of injustice told by their clients and subsequently
fail to provide substantive justice to their clients.7 7 At times, they catch
glimpses through the eyes of their clients of a reality where the rule of law
is much more tenuous than they were led to believe in their courses at law
school.78 Many of my students have expressed these feelings of outrage in
clinical law seminar discussions or have articulated their feelings in their
critical journal reflections about their experiences.
These stories and glimpses into the worlds of clients at the clinic may
function as "disorienting moments" for law students who find that their
conceptions of justice and the role of law in achieving social justice have
been challenged through their clinical experiences. As Fran Quigley has
observed:
Most... students come to the course without significant exposure...
representing a person trying to wring a just result from an often
unresponsive legal system. When the learners are confronted with their
clients' very real suffering and frustration, the learners' necessarily
abstract understanding of social justice often prevents assimilation of the
experience. Hence, disorientation occurs[.] 79
77. For analysis and commentary on the failures of legal decision-makers and lawyers to hear stories
of clients, see, generally, Lucie E White, "Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday
Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G." (1990) 38 Buff L Rev 1; Barbara Bezdek, "Silence in the
Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal Processes" (1992) 20 Hofstra
L Rev 533; and Christopher P Gilkerson, "Poverty Law Narratives: the Critical Practice and Theory of
Receiving and Translating Client Stories" (1992) 43 Hastings LJ 861.
78. See Janet Mosher, "Lessons in Access to Justice: Racialized Youths and Ontario's Safe Schools"
(2008) 46 Osgoode Hall U 807 for a discussion of the ways in which marginalized youth in Toronto
experienced an absence of the rule of law in their interactions with police and school administrators.
79. See Fran Quigley, "Seizing the Disorienting Moment: Adult Learning Theory and the Teaching
of Social Justice in Law School Clinics" (1995) 2 Clinical L Rev 37 at 53.
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This feeling of outrage or indignation about injustice may for some
students, as it does for Abbe Smith, fuel a feeling of responsibility to "fight
for justice" on behalf of their clients. The feeling of outrage may spark a
sense of courage, motivation, and dedication for students. Certainly, this
energizing impact of moral anger is significant in that it may "be regarded
as an emotion that forces confrontation... [that] has the potential to disrupt
existing power relations."80
However, in this section I argue that if clinical law students and lawyers
fail to critically interrogate our emotional responses in these contexts,
we may unwittingly assume that our responses of outrage are sufficient
"gauges" of injustice and that our feelings legitimate certain responses
on the part of legal professionals. Very often, these responses envision
lawyers and the legal system at the centre of the solution to clients' troubles
and give law students and lawyers a privileged role in addressing these
problems. These responses dwell on the lawyer-client relationship and
view the lawyer as the central agent in the quest to address injustice. Such
responses can function to stultify broader, politicized, and community-
centred approaches to advocacy and legal practice.
What is required is an ability to critically interpret and "read"
our emotional responses in clinical legal education contexts and an
understanding that our feelings always involve interpretation. As Sara
Ahmed writes, the emotion of anger always involves a "reading" of pain or
injustice and therefore always requires interpretation.8' The question, then,
for Ahmed, is "[w]hat form of action is possible given that reading?" 2 For
law students, pre-established ideas about justice, social relations, and the
role of lawyers inform this process of interpretation and also, as described
above, may inform ideas about the proper response by lawyers. A critical
reading of our feelings of outrage and indignation at injustice thus requires
us to interrogate existing assumptions about justice, the role of law,
and legal systems in addressing injustice and the role of lawyers in this
process. It requires us to seek to "move.. .from anger into an interpretation
of that which one is against, whereby associations or connections are made
between the object of the anger and broader patterns or structures."83 This
process is what Michalinos Zembylas might describe as the "politicization"
80. Linda Grasso, The Artistry of Anger: Black and White Women's Literature in America, 1820-
1860 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2002) at 11.
81. Ahmed, supra note 14 at 175.
82. lbid at 175 [emphasis in original].
83. Ibid at 176.
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of emotions in educational contexts, which he advocates isa crucial means
for addressing questions of "otherness, difference, and power."84
In the sections that follow, I suggest three aspects or components of
a critical reading of moral anger in clinical legal education contexts. The
first aspect involves recognition and acknowledgement of moral anger in
clinical law contexts. This is important given prevailing approaches to
the disciplining and management of strong emotions in legal practice and
pedagogies. Second, a critical reading of moral anger requires lawyers
and law students to resist an approach in which our "feeling" of moral
anger compels us to embrace "epistemological imperialism" and regnant
lawyering practices which blind us to critical self-reflection. 85 Third, I
discuss ways in which moral anger might be directed towards potentially
transformative and community-based approaches to practice characterized
by collaboration, humility, and mutuality.
1. Recognizing and affirming moral anger in clinical law contexts
In clinical law contexts, pedagogies focused on critical analysis of
emotional responses must recognize that law students are constantly
contending with dominant discourses and understandings about the
role of emotions in law and legal practice. As discussed earlier, these
discourses construct emotions as falling outside the realm of law, and
promote technocratic portrayals of "cool" and "tough" lawyers. While
these dominant images of lawyers might be tempered by alternate images
of "emotionally intelligent" lawyers, the discourses about these "new"
lawyers also tend to portray emotions as private and manageable attributes
that do not function to challenge power structures.
Thus, law students inevitably carry with them various ideas about the
role of emotions and the importance of regulating emotional reactions
in legal practice. Because of the dominant negative approach to overt
expressions of emotions in legal education contexts, many law students may
understand reactions of moral outrage as being upsetting, unprofessional,
and "outside" the bounds of the legal realm in which they are operating.
Some students whose interactions with clients, the legal system, or other
aspects of their clinical work spark feelings of outrage at injustice may
experience an urge to temper and regulate these feelings and to identify
them as "out of place" in a clinical law environment.
It is crucial then to acknowledge dominant discourses about emotions
within legal education contexts and to engage students in a process of
84. Zembylas, supra note 9 at 16.
85. See Imai, supra note 5 at 197.
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analyzing the ways in which these dominant understandings work to
"discipline" and constitute their feelings. Thus, acknowledging emotions
such as moral outrage in clinical law contexts can represent a challenge to
dominant ideas in legal education contexts.
The process of encouraging students to analyze their emotional
responses to their clinical law experiences and to analyze the ways in
which dominant ideas about lawyers and emotions shape these feelings,
may be risky from a pedagogical perspective. Clinical law teachers may
be wary of acknowledging emotions or expressing their own emotional
reactions for fear of being identified as being "touchy-feely" or "soft."
As Margaret Thornton points out, law professors often deliberately frame
their subject matter in a "hard," rational, and technocratic fashion in
order to gain legitimacy within the discipline.16 Thus, acknowledging and
discussing emotional responses at all is an important initial step.
2. Anger, power, and "feeling better"
A critical reading of moral anger in clinical law contexts should, after
acknowledging the feeling, examine the ways that feelings of anger may
perpetuate dominant power structures in lawyer-client relationships.
It must question to what extent the feeling of moral outrage allows the
subject of that emotion to, in fact, "feel better" about injustice.8 7 It must
resist an approach to emotions that becomes what Kathleen Woodward
calls "a kind of narcissistic self-regard that blocks a commitment to
structural transformation."88
Sara Ahmed's theoretical work on emotions and moral anger provides
a helpfuJ framework for this task. By examining the ways in which
dominant media focuses on eliciting emotional reactions from privileged,
Western readers-including the emotion of moral outrage--on behalf of
victims of poverty, famine, or violence in far-flung parts of the world,
Ahmed points out the ways in which emotions can reproduce dominant
power relations.8 1 She notes that certain spectres of injustice (for example,
individual stories of the suffering of children) may evoke strong emotional
reactions, whereas other stories of injustice will fail to evoke any feelings
at all.9" Indeed, as Megan Boler points out, our failure to invest emotionally
in so many issues and injustices is indicative of "emotional selectivity"
86. Thornton, supra note 13 at 373.
87. Ahmed, supra note 14 at 201 .
88. Kathleen Woodward, Statistical Panic: Cultural Politics and Poetics of the Emotions (Durham,
NC: Duke University Press, 2009) at 56.
89. Ahmed, supra note 14 at 197.
90. Ibid at 191-192.
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or emotional "(in)attention," which are habits that may privilege certain
political and ideological narratives.91 This recognition reminds us that our
feelings are not, in fact, entirely accurate gauges of injustice, but are rather
mediated through pre-existing frames. 92
Ahmed also points out that although stories of injustice, war, and
violence are disconcerting for spectators, emotions such as grief and moral
outrage function to allow these privileged Western spectators to "feel
better" about the injustices that they are witnessing through subsequent
discourses of compassion and charity. Ahmed explains that this happens
through the production of the figure of the dominant Western subject, who
experiences emotions "about" others who become "objects of feeling."
Ahmed writes that feelings of anger that Western subjects may experience
"when faced with the other's pain is what allows the [subject] to enter
into a relationship with the other, premised on generosity rather than
indifference."93 She goes on to explain that the feeling of anger "about"
the suffering or injustice experienced by others by dominant Western
subjects is "an 'aboutness' that ensure[s] that they remain the object of our
'feeling."' 94
By feeling strongly "about" the "objects" of injustice, Ahmed argues
that privileged members of Western society are able to effectively erase
histories of colonialism through discourses of charity, compassion, and
action on behalf of victimized and marginalized people.95 Ahmed's
observation is similar to Megan Boler's caution that our emotions may
function as ways of permitting ourselves to abdicate or separate from
oppressive histories.96 While separating from histories of oppression,
dominant subjects of emotion may also actively "claim" power and
recognition by engaging in charitable actions and requiring gratitude
for these actions.97 It is for these reasons that Ahmed argues that feeling
intensely about an injustice is not "necessarily to repair the costs of
injustice. Indeed, this conversion can repeat the forms of violence it seeks
to redress, as it can sustain the distinction between the subject and object
of feeling."98
91. Boler, supra note 29 at 185-186.
92. For a discussion of the functions of 'frames," see Judith Butler, Frames of War: When is Life
Grievable? (London, UK: Verso, 2009) 5-12.
93. Ahmed, supra note 14 at 21.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid at 22.
96. Boler, supra note 29 at 186.
97. Ahmed, supra note 14 at 192-193.
98. Ibid at 193.
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Ahmed's critical insights about emotions generally, and moral anger in
particular, assist in the process of critically reading moral anger in clinical
law contexts. First, Ahmed's observation that our emotional responses are
often selective and mediated reminds us to examine the dominant legal and
moral frames through which lawyers and law students assess and gauge
injustice in the lives of our clients. It also reminds us that the individualized
stories of clients at legal clinics are often connected to larger and systemic
patterns and structures and that the solutions to these endemic problems
are never found solely through an emphasis on individual relationships
with clients or individualized advocacy.99
Ahmed's caution-that feeling strongly about injustice is not necessary
to fix the personal and societal costs of injustice-is important in that it
reminds clinical lawyers and students to examine urges towards "rescue
fantasies" and ideas about their own agency to enact change on behalf of
clients. 0 Thus, clinical legal educators should be careful that feelings of
"moral anger" on behalf of clients are not experienced as a means to simply
"feel better" about injustice and to legitimize and fuel a sense of our own
agency in achieving solutions to injustice. Certainly, lawyers who seek to
insert themselves at the centre of solutions for clients are very likely to
be ineffective at working within communities that seek social change.' 0'
Indeed, Alfieri and others warn of the potential for lawyers to replicate
unequal power relations in their relationships with clients: lawyers tend to
"reenact the cultural and socio-economic marginalization of poor clients
and communities in their advocacy."' 102 Lawyers who subject their feelings
to a critical reading may thus find that clients do not seek rescuing, but, in
fact, have actively resisted oppressive structures and have developed many
tactics, goals, and alliances with larger communities that can be engaged
in the struggle for social justice.0 3 In other words, lawyers engaged in a
critical reading of their feelings of moral anger will recognize that feelings
are not in fact gauges of injustice, nor are they necessary to fix injustice.
While engaging in heroic legal interventions may help clinical lawyers
and students "feel better," these interventions rarely address the systemic
99. See, generally, Sameer M Ashar, "Law Clinics and Collective Mobilization" (2008) 14 Clinical
L Rev 355.
100. Peter Margulies, "Re-framing Empathy in Clinical Legal Education" (1999) 5 Clinical L Rev
605 at 620-621.
101. Lopez, supra note 50 at 23-25. See also William P Quigley, "Reflections of Community
Organizers: Lawyering for Empowerment of Community Organizations" (1994) 21 Ohio NUL Rev
455.
102. Anthony V Alfieri, "Faith in Community: Representing 'Colored Town' (2007) 95 Cal L Rev
1829 at 1852.
103. See discussion in Ashar, supra note 99 at 356-357.
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roots of the troubles that persist in the communities of our clients and
may serve to reproduce and entrench power relations between lawyer and
clients.
2. Moving from moral outrage to social justice
Zembylas and Chubbuck state that emotions are "socially and politically
formed components of action, serving a crucial role in either addressing
injustice or sustaining the status quo."1°4 As I have argued above, without a
critical and politicized "reading" of our feelings and anger about injustice,
clinical lawyers and students may assume that they play a central role in
addressing the injustice experienced by clients and may fail to interrogate
whether their practices in fact promote a change to the status quo.
Furthermore, because traditional regnant approaches to legal practice
seldom lead to the amelioration of systemic injustice experienced by
clients and communities, students spurred on by moral outrage to confront
injustice through traditional legal approaches will also find themselves
disappointed and possibly deflated.'015 How then can we "read" moral
anger in a way that has transformative and social justice implications?
How can anger can be channeled into what Zembylas and Chubbuck term
"activism against inequality"?0 6
While a response of moral outrage at injustice may alert us to conditions
of injustice, we must recognize that our initial "reading" of the situation
is at best partial. We must therefore seek a deeper understanding and a
wider view through a contextual and community-informed understanding.
As Zembylas writes, "the first step in using anger as a mode of thoughtful
analysis... is to understand where anger is coming from and what power
relations are involved."'0 7 Such an approach would urge us to askquestions
including: what is the community and political context in which the
injustice has arisen? What is already being done within the community on
this issue? How do our individual clients affected by the specific situation
or law perceive the problem? How do community allies think lawyers can
or should be involved? Our reading of injustice is not complete without the
assistance of clients and the community. This requires us to be alert to the
104. Michalinos Zembylas & Sharon Chubbuck, "Emotions and Social Inequalities: Mobilizing
Emotions for Social Justice Education" in PA Schultz & Michalinos Zembylas, eds, Advances in
Teacher Emotion Research: The Impact on Teachers 'Lives (Boston, MA: Springer-Verlag, 2009) 343
at 348.
105. See discussion in Margot Young, "Why Rights Now? Law and Desperation" in Margot Young,
Susan B Boyd et al, eds, Poverty: Rights, Social Citizenship, Legal Activism (Vancouver, BC: UBC
Press, 2007) 317 at 331.
106. Zembylas & Chubbuck, supra note 104 at 355.
107. Zembylas, supra note 9 at 131.
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spaces where clients and communities are actively resisting injustice and
contemporary forms of colonialism in their communities and strategizing
against multiple layers of oppression.t°8
In other words, what is required is a committed and "long-haul"
approach that values relationships with communities, seeks understandings
from clients and communities about the sources of injustice, and analyzes
what approaches the community takes to anger and healing. 109 In the context
of the Canadian prairie city in which I live, this requires a commitment
to understanding Indigenous approaches to colonialism and healing. For
example, an Elder speaking as part of a Commission on First Nations and
M6tis Peoples and Justice Reform dialogue, in addressing the feelings of
anger and trauma evoked by residential schools, stated that "the spirituality
of our people is what pulled us through all these trials and traumas in our
lives."'110 In other words, communities who have experienced long term
traumas, oppression, and the "violence of law" best understand how to
approach feelings of anger and rage at injustice and how to work towards
healing. "'
As long-time community activists have explained, the struggle for
social justice is one that must be characterized by patience and a willingness
to see small victories in a slow journey full of setbacks.112 It is for this
reason that social justice lawyers who work closely with communities
are apt to describe love and hope as more important than outrage and
anger at injustice as emotions that are sustaining. For example, William
Quigley has written that love and hope must lie at the centre of social
justice advocacy." 3 This is reminiscent of the observations of Zembylas
and Chubbuck, who suggest that educators must find ways to encourage
the cultivation of emotions including excitement, love, and hope.'1 4
108. For a discussion of contemporary colonialism in Canada, see Taiaiake Alfred & Jeff Cormassel,
"Being Indigenous: Resurgences Against Contemporary Colonialism" in Martin J Cannon & Lina
Suseri, eds, Racism, Colonialism, and Indigeneity in Canada (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press,
2011) 139.
109. The term "long-haul" in relation to the work of lawyers in communities is from Susan D Bennett,
"On Long Haul Lawyering" (1997-1998) 25 Fordham Urb LJ 771.
110. See J Wilton Littlechild, Chair, "Commission on First Nations and Mtis Peoples and Justice
Reform: 2003 Interim Report and 2004 Final Report" in Wanda D McCaslin, ed, Justice as Healing:
Indigenous Ways (St. Paul, MN: Living Justice Press, 2005) 324 at 332.
111. For a discussion of law's violence, see, generally, Austin Sarat, ed, Law, Violence, and the
Possibility of Justice (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).
112. See Susan D Bennett, "On Long Haul Lawyering" (1997-1998) 25 Fordham Urb LJ 771; and
Ascanio Piomelli, "Sensibilities for Social Justice Lawyers" (2013) 10 Hastings Race & Pov LJ 177
at 187.
113. William P Quigley, "Letter to a Law Student Interested in Social Justice" (2007-2008) 1 DePaul
J Soc Just 7 at 27-28.
114. Zembylas & Chubbuck, supra note 104 at 355.
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Conclusion
This article has attempted to make a contribution to the growing scholarship
on law and emotions through a focus on the "troubling" emotion of moral
anger in clinical legal education contexts. Drawing on critical emotions
theories, I have argued that dominant rational or technocratic approaches
to emotions inadequately account for the role of emotions in legal practice
generally, and in poverty law contexts in particular. I have also argued
that emerging ideas about the "emotionally intelligent lawyer" also fail
to provide necessary critical insights about emotions-and especially the
emotion of moral anger-in clinical law contexts. Moral anger is troubling
because we tend to understand it as a gauge of injustice and as a source
of fuel for lawyers to address injustice. Lawyers working in poverty law
contexts witness many occasions for moral anger in their day-to-day work.
As I have argued here, the challenge is to ensure that we are engaging in
careful and critical "readings" of our feelings of moral anger so that our
anger does not motivate the replication of regnant lawyering practices on
"behalf' of clients.
Certainly, there are ways in which clinical law students and teachers
might engage in this task. Learning from communities' resistance to
colonialism and oppression and learning, in particular, about how clients
and members of these communities understand the role of anger in struggles
for justice, must be a crucial part of the process. It is important to discuss
emotions and the ways in which these emotions are culturally mediated,
and to critically analyze the ways in which emotions may function to
replicate dominant regnant notions of the lawyer-client relationship.
As Abbe Smith reminds us, in clinical and poverty law practice "[t]he
outrages just keep coming."'15 In other words, legal practice in clinical law
contexts is an emotional undertaking. It is important that clinical educators
and students examine our troubling feelings about our work carefully
and try to learn how these feelings might move us towards a critical and
community-engaged quest for understanding and social justice.
115. Supra note 10 at 1259.
